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Primal impression and enactive perception
Abstract
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently argued that perception is enactive (e.g., Varela, Thompson,
& Rosch 1991; Noe, 2004; Di Paolo, 2009). 1 To put it simply, perception is action-oriented. When I perceive
something, I perceive it as actionable. That is, I perceive it as something I can reach, or not; something I can
pick up, or not; something I can hammer with, or not, and so forth. Such affordances (Gibson, 1977, 1979)
for potential actions (even if I am not planning to take action) shape the way that I actually perceive the world.
One can find the roots of this kind of approach in the pragmatists (e.g., Dewey, 1896), but also in
phenomenologists like Edmund Husser!, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty
(1962) is most often cited in this regard, but Merleau-Ponty himself points back to Husserl's analysis of the "I
can" in Jdeen II (Husser! 1952), and to his analysis of the correlation between kinesthesia and perception
(1973b; see Zahavi, 1994 and Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008 for further discussion).
With this enactive view in mind, we revisit Husserl's account of time-consciousness. In his analysis, the very
basic temporal structure, protention-primal impression-retention, is said to characterize perception, as the
most basic form of cognition as well as consciousness in general. As such, the temporal structure of perceptual
consciousness should in some significant way reflect or enable its enactive character. Our question is this: if
perception is enactive, then at a minimum, shouldn't its temporal structure be such that it allows for that
enactive character?
In the first part of this essay, we provide a brief account of Husserl's classical analysis. We then proceed to
focus on the concept of primal impression by considering various objections that have been raised by Jacques
Derrida and Michel Henry, who basically argue in opposite directions. Derrida emphasizes the relationality of
time-consciousness and downplays the importance of the primal impression, whereas Henry emphasizes the
irrelationality of time-consciousness and downplays the importance of protention and retention. In a further
step, we consider some of Husserl's later manuscripts on time, where he revises his original privileging of the
primal impression. In the final section, we turn to the question of an enactive temporal structure.
Keywords
primal, perception, impression, enactive
Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law
Publication Details
Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (2014). Primal impression and enactive perception. In V. Arstila and D. Lloyd
(Eds.), Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality (pp. 83-99).
Cambridge: MIT Press.







Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (in press) Primal impression and enactive perception. In Dan Lloyd and 
Valtteri Arstila (eds.) Subjective Time:  the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. 






Primal impression and enactive perception 
 





Philosophers   and   cognitive   scientists   have   recently   argued   that 
perception is enactive (e.g., Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991; Noë 
2004; Di Paolo 2009).
1   
To put it simply, perception is action-oriented. 
When I perceive something, I perceive it as actionable. That is, I 
perceive it as something I can reach, or not; something I can pick up, or 
not;  something  I  can  hammer  with,  or  not,  and  so  forth. Such 
affordances (Gibson 1977, 1979) for potential actions (even if I am not 
planning to take action) shape the way that I  actually perceive the 
world. One  can  find  the  roots  of  this  kind  of  approach  in  the 
pragmatists  (e.g.,  Dewey  1896),  but  also  in  phenomenologists like 
Edmund  Husserl,  Martin  Heidegger,  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) is most often cited in this regard, but Merleau- 
Ponty himself points us back to Husserl’s analysis of the “I can” in 
Ideen II (Husserl 1952), and to his analysis of the correlation between 
kinaesthetic  activation  and  perception  (1973;  see  Zahavi  1994  and 
Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 for further discussion). 
With this enactive view in mind, we revisit Husserl’s account of 
time-consciousness.  In his analysis the very basic temporal structure, 
protention-primal  impression-retention  is  said  to  characterize 
perception,   as   the   most   basic   form   of   cognition,   as   well   as 
consciousness in general. As such, the temporal structure of perceptual 
consciousness should in some significant way reflect or enable its 
enactive character.  Our question is this: if perception is enactive, then 
at a minimum, shouldn’t its temporal structure be such that it allows for 











Following Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), we take ‘enactive’ to signify that 
perception (and cognition more generally) is characterized by a structural coupling 
between the agentive body and the environment, which is both physical and social, which 






In the first part of this essay we provide a brief account of Husserl's 
classical analysis. We then proceed to focus on the concept of primal 
impression by considering various objections that have been raised by 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Henry, who basically argue in opposite 
directions. Derrida emphasizes the relationality of time-consciousness 
and downplays the importance of the primal impression, whereas Henry 
emphasizes the irrelationality of time-consciousness and downplays the 
importance of protention and retention. In a further step, we consider 
some  of  Husserl's  later  manuscripts  on  time,  where  he  revises  his 
original privileging of the primal impression.   In the final section we 
turn to the question of an enactive temporal structure. 
 
Husserl’s classical analysis of time-consciousness 
One of the basic questions that Husserl seeks to provide an answer to in 
his famous lectures on time-consciousness is the following: How it is 
possible for us to be conscious of temporal objects, objects with a 
temporal extension. How is it possible to be conscious of objects such 
as  melodies,  which  cannot  appear  all  at  once,  but  only  unfold 
themselves over time? Husserl’s well-known thesis is that a perception 
of  a  temporal  object  (as  well  as  the  perception  of  succession  and 
change) would be impossible if consciousness merely provided us with 
the givenness of the pure now-phase of the object, and if the stream of 
consciousness were a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like 
a string of pearls. If our perception is restricted to being conscious of 
that which exists right now, it would be impossible to perceive anything 
with a temporal extension and duration, for a succession of isolated, 
punctual, conscious states does not as such enable us to be conscious of 
succession and duration. But this consequence is absurd. Thus, 
consciousness must in some way transcend the punctual now, and be 
conscious of that which has just been and is just about to occur. But 
how is this possible? How can consciousness be conscious of that which 
is no longer or not yet present? 
According to Husserl, Brentano held the position that it is our 
re-presenting (vergegenwärtigende) acts which permit us to transcend 
the now-point. We perceive that which is now, and we imagine, 
remember, or anticipate that which does not yet or no longer exists 
(Husserl 1966a, 10-19). Husserl rejects this explanation, however, since 
it implies that we cannot perceive objects with temporal duration. 
Basically, his alternative is to argue that the basic unit of perceived time 
is not, as James (1890) had termed it, a ‘knife-edge’ present, but a 
‘duration-block’, i.e., a temporal field (a “specious present”) which 
contains all three temporal modes, present, past and future.
2 
Let us 
assume that I am hearing a triad consisting of the tonal sequence C, D, 
and E. If we pay attention to perception the instant tone E sounds, we 
will not find a consciousness occupied exclusively with this tone alone, 
 
2 
In James (1890, I. pp. 609-610) one finds a related account. For a comparison of 







but a consciousness of the broader sequence E, D, and C. When I hear 
the tone E, I am still conscious of the tones D and C, but not as 
remembered. Rather I am still hearing these tones as part of an on- 
going sequence. This is not to say that there is no difference between 
our consciousness of the present tone E and our consciousness of the 
tones D and C. D and C are not simultaneous with E; they are past 
tones, and, just so, they are intuited as past, and it is exactly for this 
reason that we can say that we hear the triad in its temporal succession 
and not merely as isolated tones replacing each other abruptly. 
Husserl employs three technical terms to describe the structure 
of this temporal field. There is (1) a primal impression, which is the 
component of consciousness that is narrowly directed toward the now- 
phase of the object. Husserl is very clear about the fact that the primal 
impression cannot be thought independently of its temporal horizon 
(Husserl 1966b, 315, 337-338) – it never appears in isolation but is an 
abstract component that, by itself, cannot provide us with awareness of 
a temporal object. It is accompanied by (2) a retention, which is the 
component that provides us with a consciousness of the just-elapsed 
phase of the object, i.e., it allows us to be aware of the object or event 
as it sinks into the past, and by (3) a protention, the component that, in a 
more-or-less indefinite way, intends the phase of the object about to 
occur. The role of protention is evident in our implicit and unreflective 
anticipation of what is about to happen as experience progresses. 
According to Husserl's analysis, experience of any sort 
(perception, memory, imagination, etc.) has a common temporal 
structure such that any moment of experience contains a retentional 
reference to past moments of experience, a current openness (primal 
impression) to what is present (which may be, e.g., a currently activated 
note in a remembered or imagined melody), and a protentional 
anticipation of the moments of experience that are just about to happen. 
Consciousness involves the generation of a field of lived presence. The 
concrete and full structure of this field is determined by the protention- 
primal impression-retention structure of consciousness. Although the 
specific experiential contents of this structure from moment to moment 
progressively change, at any given moment this threefold structure is 
present (synchronically) as a unified whole. 
 
In this way, it becomes evident that concrete perception as 
original  consciousness  (original  givenness)  of  a 
temporally extended object is structured internally as itself 
a streaming system of momentary perceptions (so-called 
primal impressions). But each such momentary perception 
is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of 
momentary gradated retentions on the one side, and a 
horizon of what is coming on the other side: a horizon of 
‘protention,’ which is disclosed to be characterized as a 






Thus, on Husserl’s account a perception cannot merely be a 
perception of what is now: rather any perception of the present phase of 
an object, includes a retention of the just-past phase and a protention of 
the phase of the object about to occur (Husserl 1966b, 315). Phrased 
differently, perceptual presence is not punctual, it is a field in which 
now, no-longer-now and not-yet-now are given in a horizonal gestalt. 
This is what is required if perception of succession and duration is to be 
possible. 
Both retention and protention have to be distinguished from the 
proper cognitive acts of recollection and anticipation. There is an 
obvious difference between retaining and protending the tone which has 
just passed and is just about to occur, on one hand, and remembering 
one’s tenth birthday or looking forward to next Christmas, on the other. 
Whereas the latter are full-fledged and explicit intentional acts which 
presuppose  the  work   of   retention  and  protention,  retention  and 
protention are structural components, implicit moments of such acts of 
consciousness. They do not provide us with new intentional objects, but 
with a consciousness of the present object’s temporal horizon. Whereas 
the retention and protention occur passively without any active 
contribution from our side, explicit anticipation and recollection are acts 
which we can initiate voluntarily. Retention, in contrast to recollection 
(memory proper) is an immediate intuition or holding in presence of 
something that has just been present; recollection is a presenting (or “re- 
presenting” [Vergegenwärtigung]) of a past event (Husserl 1966a, 41, 
118, 330). 
Since the presenting function of perception or memory, or any 
such cognitive act, depends upon the contribution of retention, as a 
structural feature, and its ability to retain that which has just been 
present, it would be wrong to identify the intuitively given with that 
which in a narrow sense is present, namely the punctual now-phase of 
the object. It is, in part, for this reason that Husserl claims that the 
analysis of retention has led to a significant widening of the 
phenomenological field (Husserl 1966b, 324-325, 1973, 162). 
Let us emphasize that temporal experience, for Husserl, is not an 
object occurring in time, but neither is it merely a consciousness of 
time; rather it is itself a form of temporality, and ultimately the question 
to ask is whether it makes sense to ascribe temporal predicates to time 
itself. Perhaps this worry can explain some of Husserl’s occasionally 
somewhat enigmatic statements. Even if we ascribe some kind of 
temporality to the stream of consciousness due to its dynamic and self- 
differentiating character, we should not conflate the temporality that is 
intrinsic  to  consciousness  itself  with  the  kind  of  temporality  that 
pertains to the objects of consciousness. Husserl would reject the claim 
that there is a temporal match or isomorphism between the stream of 
consciousness and the temporal objects and events of which it is 
conscious. The relations between protention, primal impression and 
retention are not relations among items located within the temporal 






have to distinguish the objects that are constituted as temporal objects in 
the way they are structured by protention, retention and primal 
impression from the relation between the constituting structures of 
consciousness itself. Just as my experience of a red circle is neither 
circular nor red, there is a difference between the temporal givenness of 
the intentional object and the temporal givenness of  the experience 
itself. They are not temporal in the same manner. It makes, as Husserl 
writes, no sense to say of the time-constituting phenomena (the primal 
impressions, retentions, protentions) that they are “present”, “past”, or 
“future” in the way empirical objects are (Husserl 1966a, 75, 333, 375- 
376).  Rather it  is  their  very  conjunction which  makes possible  the 
senses of present, past, and future. 
 
Some critical perspectives 
Husserl’s  analysis  of  inner  time-consciousness  has  given  rise  to  a 
number of heated debates within phenomenology. Derrida, for example, 
attempted to demonstrate that all meaning, being, and manifestation, 
including the self-givenness of subjectivity, far from being original and 
simple, are products of an irreducible process of differentiation (Derrida 
1967, 68, 70). Derrida’s argumentation is decisively inspired by his 
reading of Husserl. It was Husserl’s own analyses which, according to 
Derrida, made it clear that it is impossible to speak of the simple self- 
identity of the present (Derrida 1967, 71). 
According to Derrida it would be impossible to understand the 
relation between retention and primal impression, and to comprehend 
the perpetual retentional modification, if the primal impression were a 
simple and completely self-sufficient ground and source. The primal 
impression is always already furnished with a temporal density, and the 
retentional modification is not a subsequent addendum to, but an 
integrated part of the primal impression. Rather than being a simple and 
undivided unity, the present can only appear as present due to the 
retentional modification, due to the irreducible otherness (non-present) 
of the past. Presence is differentiation; it is only in its intertwining with 
absence (Derrida 1990, 120, 123, 127). 
 
One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived 
present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is 
continuously compounded with a nonpresence and 
nonperception, with primary memory and expectation 
(retention and protention). These nonperceptions are 
neither added to, nor do they occasionally accompany, 
the actually perceived now; they are essentially and 
indispensably involved in its possibility (Derrida 1967, 
72). 
 
For Derrida, it consequently proves necessary to distinguish the 
pure primal impression, which is an empty a priori possibility, a 






appears as genetically complex, modified by retention and protention. 
We might infer that there must be something like a primal impression, 
but it is never experienced as such. The primal impression will always 
be gone before it can be fixed by consciousness. To be punctual and to 
be experiencable are exclusive determinations. For this reason it is 
necessary to ascribe a transcendental, that is, a constitutive significance, 
to a non-presence in self-awareness (Derrida 1990, 166, 1967, 5). 
To be more precise, self-presence must be conceived as an 
originary difference or interlacing between now and not-now, due to the 
intimate relation between primal impression and retention. 
Consciousness is never given in a full and instantaneous self-presence, 
but presents itself to itself across the difference between now and not- 
now. Presence is possible thanks to the retentional trace. It emerges on 
the background of a non-identity; it is haunted by the alterity of the 
absent and always presupposes an othering (Bernet 1994, 216, 235, 
283). 
 
As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the 
not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of 
primordiality common to primordial impression and 
primordial retention, we admit the other into the self- 
identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence 
are admitted into the blink of the instant. There is a 
duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is 
in fact the condition for presence [...] (Derrida 1967, 73). 
 
One somewhat disturbing implication of this is that 
consciousness appears to itself not as it is, but as it has just been. 
Initially, the initiating moment is unconscious, and it only gains self- 
presence nachträglich through the retentional modification.3 
Now, whereas Derrida argued that Husserl failed to draw the full 
implications of his discovery of the retentional modification, we find 
the exact opposite criticism in Henry, namely, that Husserl assigned too 
great significance to the work of retention. Whereas post-Husserlian 
phenomenology has generally tried to rectify what was believed to be 
an imbalance in Husserl’s account of the relation between immanence 
and transcendence, namely his disregard of exteriority, Henry has 
accused Husserl of never having managed to disclose the true interiority 
of  subjectivity  in  a  sufficiently  radical  and  pure  manner.  Thus, 
according to Henry, the basic problem in Husserl’s phenomenology is 
not that it somehow remained unable to free itself from immanence, but 
on the contrary, that it kept introducing external elements into its 
analysis of this immanence. As Henry suggests, it is downright absurd 
to accuse Husserl of having advocated a philosophy of pure presence, 
since Husserl never managed to conceive of a presence liberated from 










Henry argues that Husserl mistakenly sought to analyze the self- 
presence of consciousness in terms of the ecstatic-centered structure of 
protention-primal impression-retention. According to Henry, however, 
this introduces a retentional mediation into the core of self- 
manifestation, and thereby furnishes it with a complexity that is utterly 
foreign to its nature (Henry 1990, 49-50). 
Against this background it is hardly surprising that Henry rejects 
Derrida’s claim that the self-manifestation of the primal impression is 
due to the intervention of the retention, and that subjectivity only gains 
self-presence in temporal adumbrations. Indeed, Henry goes so far as to 
claim that the dimension of primary self-manifestation is non-ecstatic, 
non-temporal, and non-horizonal (Henry 1963, 576, 349). It is non- 
horizonal insofar as the manifestation does not presuppose or entail a 
reference to anything transcendent or absent. It is non-ecstatic in the 
sense that the living ego never appears to itself across a recollection or 
oblivion;  and  it  is  immediate  in  the  strict  sense  of  being  neither 
mediated nor delayed. We are ultimately dealing with a self-presence 
characterized by its complete unified self-adherence and self- 
coincidence (Henry 1963, 858), and this unity is neither constituted (by 
anything else) nor is it extended in protentions and retentions (Henry 
1965, 139). 
Although both Derrida and Henry end up criticizing Husserl’s 
theory of inner time-consciousness, they both remain deeply influenced 
by his account.
4 
At the same time, however, both also seem to end up 
defending positions that are themselves too radical. The question is 
whether Husserl’s own account might not provide us with a sound 
position that avoids the opposing excesses of both Henry and Derrida. 
At  first  sight,  Derrida’s  description  of  the  relation  between 
primal   impression   and   retention   appears   somewhat   misleading. 
Although one might characterize the relation between primal impression 
and retention as a question of internal differentiation, it is strictly 
speaking  erroneous  to  characterize  it  with  terms  like  ‘delay’  and 
‘absence’. As it was pointed out above, retention and protention are not 
past or future in regard to the primal impression. They are ‘together’ 
with it, and the self-manifestation of enduring consciousness 
consequently possesses the full structure protention-primal impression- 
retention. Thus, it is not the retention, but that which is given in it, 
namely, the retained, which is past, an absence kept in presence. 
Ultimately, Derrida’s argumentation contains a puzzling tension. On the 
one hand, he wants to stress the intimate connection and continuity 
between  primal  impression  and  the  retention.  It  is  a  falsifying 
abstraction to speak of them in isolation and separation. But, on the 
other hand, he also wants to describe the retention as being different 





Henry in Phénoménologie matérielle describes Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur 
Phänomenologie   des  inneren  Zeitbewußtseins   as  the  most  beautiful  philosophical 






speak of impressional self-awareness as being mediated and constituted 
by the alterity of the retention. 
Whereas Derrida argues that retention has priority over primal 
impression, Henry argues that primal impression has priority over 
retention. The question though is whether any of these alternatives are 
really attractive. Taken in isolation, the primal impression is an 
abstraction and theoretical limit-case. It is in fact never given alone. The 
concrete and full structure of the lived presence, according to Husserl, is 
protention-primal impression-retention (Husserl 1966b, 317, 378). It is 
‘immediately’ given as an ecstatic unity and is not a gradual, delayed or 
mediated process of self-unfolding. Lived presence has an internal 
differentiation, an original complexity, but to speak of it as being 
mediated or delayed is to remain determined by a conception which 
sees primal impression and retention as two different and separate 
elements. One has to avoid the idea of an instantaneous, non-temporal 
self-presence, but one must also stay clear of the notion of a completely 
fractured time-consciousness which makes both consciousness of the 




So far we presented a brief survey of Husserl’s standard depiction of the 
structure of inner time-consciousness, centered on the three components 
of primal impression, retention and protention. We then looked at two 
quite different phenomenologically motivated criticisms of Husserl’s 
account  and  considered  what  a  likely  Husserlian  response  would 
amount to. Let us now move forward and take a look at some of 
Husserl’s later texts on time-consciousness, in particular his so-called 
Bernau Manuscripts which were written around 1917-1918. What we 
will  find  there  is  Husserl’s  own  revision  of  the  original  tripartite 
account.  The  main  difference  is  that  the  primal  impression  (or  as 
Husserl calls it in the Bernau Manuscripts: the ‘primal presentation’) 
rather than being the origin and point of departure is considered the 
result of an interplay between retention and protention. Compare for 
illustration the two following quotations. The first is from the original 
lectures on time-consciousness, the other from the Bernau Manuscripts: 
 
The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, 
the primal source of all further consciousness and being. 
Primal impression has as its content that which the word 
“now” signifies, insofar as it is taken in the strictest sense. 
(Husserl 1966a, 67). 
 
The now (i.e., the primal presentation) is the boundary 
between two different ‘re-presentational’ acts, the retentions 





We note some shifting terminology here.  In many other places Husserl 







In short, whereas the retentions and protentions in the early lectures 
were defined vis-a-vis the primal impression, in his later research 
manuscripts, Husserl argues that the primal impression must be 
considered the line of intersection between the retentional and 
protentional tendencies that make up every momentary phase of 
consciousness. Just as in his earlier account, Husserl continues to claim 
that the primal presentation by itself doesn’t present at all, it is not self- 
sufficient,   rather   its   presenting  occurs   only   in   connection  with 
retentions and protentions. But in addition, and this is where the Bernau 
Manuscripts are more radical, Husserl also seems to suggest that the 
complicated interlacing of retentions and protentions is constitutive of 
presence. The primal impression is not only non-self-sufficient, it is a 
constitutive product rather than something with a constitutive 
contribution of its own. This more radical claim is for instance brought 
to light in Husserl’s idea that the point of departure rather than being the 
primal impression (or primal presentation), is the empty anticipation: 
 
First there is an empty expectation, and then there is the 
point of the primary perception, itself an intentional 
experience. But the primary presentation comes to be in the 
flow only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents relative 
to the preceding empty intentions, thereby changing itself 
into primal presenting perception   [Zuerst ist eine leere 
Erwartung, und dann ist der Punkt der Urwahrnehmung, die 
selbst ein intentionales Erlebnis ist. Aber dieses wird doch 
im Fluss erst durch Eintreten der Urpräsenzen als füllende 
Inhalte in die vorhergehende Leerintentionen, die sich damit 
wandelt in urpräsentierende Wahrnehmung] (Husserl 2001, 
4). 
 
In short, the primal presentation is conceived as the fulfilment of an 
empty protention; the now is constituted by way of a protentional 
fulfilment (Husserl 2001, 4, 14). Occasionally, Husserl even describes 
the matter in a way that doesn’t mention the primal impression at all: 
 
Each constituting full phase is the retention of a fulfilled 
protention, which is the horizonal boundary of an unfulfilled 
and for its part continuously mediated protention.   [Jede 
konstituierende Gesamtphase ist Retention erfüllter 
Protention, welche Grenze eines Horizonts, einer unerfüllten 
und ihrerseits kontinuierlich mittelbaren Protention ist 




re-presentational acts (vergegenwärtigenden  Akten) retentions and 
protentions are not.  Perhaps we can attribute this slippage in 
terminology to the fact that the Bernau Manuscripts are working notes 







The return of the Urimpression 
 
Taking Husserl’s considerations in the Bernau Manuscripts as 
inspiration, let us reconsider the question that was also at the center of 
Derrida’s and Henry’s criticisms, namely the status of the primal 
impression. We propose to develop the analysis in the direction of 
genetic and enactive phenomenology. 
If  we  remain with  a  static phenomenology, the notion of  the 
primal impression plays an important role in the structure of time- 
consciousness.  If, however, we take a more genetic view, the notion of 
an isolated primal impression seems to be an abstraction and not 
something that exists in itself.  As we have seen, Husserl himself, and 
some of his commentators, indicate just this: that the concept of the 
primal impression is an abstraction   As Klaus Held (1966, 19) puts it, 
“from a phenomenological perspective, there is no such thing as an 
infinitely short momentary perception” – that is, experientially there is 
no such thing as an isolated primal impression.  On the other hand, 
however, one could argue that there must be something like a limit or 
division  between  retention  and  protention,  aspects  which  do 
characterize our experience, but which need to be differentiated. 
Lanei Rodemeyer (2006, 33) suggests that primal impression 
might be considered an overlap between retention and protention.   In 
that case too, it is nothing in itself, but the product of retention and 
protention, and a paradoxical one since as an overlap it seemingly must 
be both retention and protention at once.   Rodemeyer suggests that 
Husserl is consistent in conceiving of the experienced now as more than 
a mere point – “the experiencing now can never be atomized” (2006, 
34).  This is certainly right, but we shouldn’t forget that Husserl doesn’t 
equate the experiencing or the experienced now with primal impression. 
Rather, in his view the experienced now has the triadic structure due to 
protention-primal impression-retention. 
Any  momentary  phase  of  consciousness,  which  itself  is  an 
abstraction, is composed of protention-primal impression-retention. 
Primal impression is not a momentary phase of consciousness – it’s part 
of the structure of any momentary phase.  In that case it is something 
like an abstraction within an abstraction – it’s the structure of a piece of 
consciousness that has been lifted out of the flow.  It is the part of the 
structure that focuses on the now point of the temporal object.  But this 
focus is not equivalent to a conscious attention, since any conscious 
attention would itself, in any momentary phase, have the structure of a 
momentary phase of consciousness, which would include a primal 
impression. 
Let’s widen the scope of the discussion.  Primal impression is 
supposedly the consciousness of the now point of the temporal stimulus 
(S) – e.g., in Husserl’s favorite example, the note that is currently being 
sounded, or more precisely, the current moment of the note that is 






perspective of phenomenology it is inappropriate to appeal to 
neurophysiology, which tells us that there is always some delay or 
distortion introduced between the current moment of a stimulus as it 
objectively exists, and our awareness of it – a delay or temporal 
distortion introduced by the mechanisms of neural processing.  That is, 
it takes time for the current moment of S to register through the neural 
processing and consciously appear as being now.  Our experience of S 
as being now, in this strict momentary sense, is always after the fact – 
the result of a neurophysiological retention. One might say that our 
access to the present is always through a small bit of the past, or that we 
never experience the objective present as such. 
These considerations are clearly bracketed out by Husserl, and we 
can effect this bracketing simply by saying that the current moment of 
the note refers to the current moment of the experienced note.  It’s not 
the note as objectively sounded, but the note as experienced.  Without 
appealing to the objective processes of neurophysiology, however, we 
may  still  look  to  certain  considerations  in  the  neuroscience  of 
movement, and do so in a way that is more than an appeal to analogy. 
As some have argued (Berthoz 2000; Gallagher 2005; in press) the 
protention-primal impression-retention model applies to movement and 
non-conscious motor processes, as well as it does to consciousness.  We 
could say that human experience and human action are both 
characterized by a ubiquitous temporality. In this regard, when we look 
at action we can say that at any one moment the body is in some precise 
posture – as captured by a snapshot, for example – but that posture is a 
complete abstraction from the movement since in each case the body is 
not posturing from moment to moment, but is constantly on the way, in 
the flow of the movement such that the abstract postural moment only 
has meaning as part of that process.  One could argue that objectively 
speaking, at any moment the body actually is in a specific posture.  But 
if that postural moment is anything, it is the product of an anticipated 
trajectory, of where the action is heading. Furthermore, we can define 
that abstract postural moment only when it is already accomplished -- 
but that means, only in retention, and as an end point of what had been a 
movement characterized primarily by anticipation. 
We should think of consciousness in the same way – as Husserl 
does – as a flow, where it is intentionally directed in such a way that 
when I am hearing the current note of a melody I'm already moving 
beyond it, and such protentional/anticipatory moving beyond is already 
a leaving behind in retention.  What we have as the basic datum of 
experience is a process, through which the primal impression is already 
collapsing into the retentional stream even as it is directed forward in 
protention. Hearing a melody (or even a single note in some context -- 
and  there  is  always  a  context)  never  involves  hearing  a  currently 
sounded note (or part of a note), and then moving beyond it; rather, the 
"and then" is already effected, already implicit in the experience. 
One way to express this is to say that talk of any one of the three 






present is always dynamic and (because) it is always structured by 
protention-primal impression-retention. Pre-reflectively, consciousness 
has this structure.   There is no impression of the present taken as a 
knife-edge; rather, as Husserl suggests, primal impression is already 
fulfilling (or not) protentions that have already been retained, and in 
doing so is already informing the current protentional process. This 
structure constitutes a specious present, and our experience of that is 
what one might call a secondary impression -- i.e., not a primary 
impression of a knife-edge present, but a secondary (constituted) 
impression of a specious present.  What I experience in this immediate 
now is a complex presence. 
To put it differently, the proposal is not that we should eliminate 
the primal impression. The point is rather that we should abandon the 
idea that primal impression is a direct, straight and simple apprehension 
of some now-point of S that is unaffected by retention and protention. 
If I perceive a currently sounding note, for example, what I perceive is 
already modified by my just past and passing awareness of whatever 
came directly before.   In that sense, primal impression is already 
modified by the retentional performance of consciousness.  There is no 
primal impression that is not already qualified by retention.   It is not 
that in a now phase of consciousness I have a retention of a past phase 
plus a primal impression of a current S.  It is not an additive function. 
The full experience of a melody is not well described by saying that I 
first experience (in primal impression) note A,  and then (in a new 
primal impression) note B, as I retain note A.  Or more precisely, the 
full experience is not given by 
 
… iA … followed by …  iB plus r[iA] … 
(where i = primal impression and r = retention). 
Rather, iB is already qualified (impacted, transduced, modified) by the 
just previous experience.  For example, in Bach’s Concerto in B minor 
the note B-minor sounded at a certain point will sound different from 
the note B-minor sounded at a certain point in Vivaldi’s Concerto in B 
minor.  So the primal impression of B is never simply iB; it is iB that 
works its way through r[iA], that is, through the relevant retentional 
train of experience. That means that iB would be a different experience 
if it were preceded not by iA, but by i[~A], just as much as r[iA] would 
have to be different if in fact it were r[i{~A}]. 
Consider further the effect of protention (p). First, the primal 
impression of A, (iA), when occurrent, is producing a determination of 
what my protentional horizon is – e.g., a protention of B … C …D … 
and so on.  That is, whatever I anticipate must be modified by what I am 
currently experiencing.  Furthermore, the primal impression of B, (iB), 
when  occurrent,  is  already  qualified  by  the  previous  protention 
(currently retained), whether that was a protention of B (now fulfilled), 







(1) primal impression constrains the current protention, and 
(2) primal impression is constrained by the previous protention. 
 
With respect to (2), this means that the occurrent primal impression is 
partially either the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of the previous 
protention. With respect to (1), primal impression constrains protention, 
the primal impression provides partial specification of what I am 
anticipating. Primal impression includes a protentional specification. 
 
Again, it is not 
 
… iA plus p[B…C…D…] … 
 
which is then simply followed by 
 
…  iB plus r[iA + p{B…C…D}] plus p[C …D…] … 
 
Rather, the primal impression of B, (iB), already contains specification 
of the previous (now retained) protention (with continuing reference to 
C and D as forthcoming) as fulfilled (or as the case may be, as 
unfulfilled).  My occurrent primal impression of B would be different if 
instead of a protention of B…C…D in the previous phase of experience 
I had anticipated silence or a different note. The primal impression of B 
confirming a previous protention of B is different from the primal 
impression of B disconfirming a protention of ~B. 
One objection to this may be that we have confused the content of 
experience with the formal temporal properties of the experience.  That 
is, someone could object that the analysis of time consciousness, which 
is about how one experienced note follows another, is not about the 
difference between how we hear Bach and Vivaldi.  But this objection 
ignores the fact that what I experience has an effect on the temporality 
of my experience. If, for instance, I am bored by Bach and find Vivaldi 
vivacious, then Bach’s Concerto in B minor will seem to drag on – time 
will seem to slow down – in contrast to my listening to Vivaldi’s 
concerto.   If I’m hungry, or mad, or in pain, retentionally and 
protentionally experience will be temporally different from my satiated, 
happy, pain-free listening experience. To that extent, content has an 
effect on the specifications of the formal structure. As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, there is an "influence of the 'contents' on time which passes 
'more quickly' or 'less quickly', of Zeitmaterie on Zeitform" (1968, 184). 
Temporal masking is another example of contents determining the 
experienced temporal order of things.    For example, the tonal 
arrangement of sounds presented in a sequence can affect the perception 
of that sequence.  If in the sequence of sounds ABCDBA, the tones A 
and B are of a particular low frequency, the order of C and D will be 
masked.  That is, you will not be able to distinguish the order of C and 






before D, or so that D will appear to come before C (see Bregman and 
Rudnicky 1975).  But it’s not simply that the conscious retention of A 
and B determines the phenomenal order of C and D, since the later 
sounds of B and A are also required to get these effects.  That is, the 
sounds that follow C and D in the objective sequential order will also 
determine the way C and D play out on the conscious level.
6
 
Consider, as another example, that in many cases the meaning of 
a  word  in  a  sentence is  deferred until  a  phrase or  the  sentence is 
complete, so that the word itself, as it is read or sounded, motivates a 
certain anticipation towards the fulfillment of its meaning. The word 
‘cases’ in the previous sentence is an example. It doesn’t refer to a 
container (e.g., cases of wine), or to grammatical cases (cases of a noun 
or  pronoun);  but  it’s  meaning  is  already  anticipated  before  that 
ambiguity gets resolved, and the remainder of the sentence fulfills that 
anticipation. If the content of the paragraph that preceded this paragraph 
had been about a grammatical point, then it could have biased my 
anticipation of the meaning of the word ‘cases’, and clearly my 
subsequent primal impressions would have been different since they 
would not have fulfilled the prior protention.  Such things often slow 
down our reading and make us go back over text to get clarification.
7 
Of 
course   one   can   still   say   that   there   is   some   level   of   formal 
temporalization that remains invariant – whatever the content, or 
whatever the phenomenological velocity or experienced serial order, or 
the implicit temporality of the object itself, I do experience a sequence 
in which some S precedes another.  But what S that happens to be, and 
what order it comes in, and how fast it happens to swim by, make all the 
difference in experience. 
In  one  respect we  can  say  that  primal impression targets the 
current moment of the object S.  But not without already being infected 
by (being influenced by) the retentional train of what has just happened, 
and by the protentional horizon of whatever is anticipated. To talk of 
primal impression as intuiting the current moment without insisting on 
the effects of retention and protention already at work, shaping primal 
impression, is to talk of an abstraction. If we say that primal impression 
is part of the structure of the living present -- that's true, but it's not 
enough.   We also have to say that the primal impression is itself 
structured by its very dynamic participation in its relations to retention 
and protention (and vice versa, of course).  My primal impression of the 
current moment is influenced by the retentional train -- it's not just the 
abstract beginning point of that train as if the business of retention was 
strictly about the past and had no influence on the present.  And, my 
primal impression of the current moment is already influenced by 




The effect here is similar to the phi phenomenon, where the color of a dot that 
appears later has an effect on my experience of the apparent color of the apparently 
moving dot. 
7
Other examples of effects of content on experienced temporal sequence can be found 






especially), but also by previously retained protentions. 
It  thus  starts  to  look  like  time-consciousness  has  a  fractal 
character.  Having distinguished primal impression from retention and 
protention, in the protention-primal impression-retention structure, any 
closer examination of primal impression (or retention or protention) 
finds that same structure repeated – again, not in an additive way, but in 
a kind of fractal effect.  This is not an overlap (as Rodemeyer suggests), 
but an effect that multiplies itself in such a way that any attempt to 
define primal impression in itself always finds the effects of retention or 
protention already included.  It is consistent with Husserl’s indication 
that “it pertains to the essence of conscious life to contain an intentional 
intertwining, motivation and mutual implication by meaning …” 
(although whether it does so  “in a way which in its form and principle 
has no analogue at all in the physical” [1977, p. 26] is an issue that we 
set aside here; see Thompson 2008, p. 356 for discussion). 
Here, perhaps, is one way to think of this -- and it's why we 
suggest the image of the fractal:  The structure of the living present – 
the now phase of consciousness – is protention-primal impression- 
retention.  But each element also reflects this structure again – primal 
impression, by itself, is an abstraction, but to think it in this structure is 
to think it with (or having) this structure – primal impression, in its 
intentional functioning, reflects the retentional and protentional 
components, and vice versa. 
What this amounts to is that there is no primal impression -- no 
current intuition of the present S -- without it already being anticipatory 
(on the basis of what has just occurred), so that my primal impression of 
the present is already involved in an enactive anticipation of how S will 
work  out.    Protention,  primal  impression,  and  retention  are  in  an 
enactive structure in regard to S in the sense that a certain anticipatory 
aspect (already shaped by what has just gone before) is already 
complicating  the  immediacy  of  the  present.    Consciousness  is  not 
simply a passive reception of the present; it enacts the present, it 
constitutes   its   meaning   in   the   shadow   of   what   has   just   been 
experienced, and in the light of what it anticipates. 
This view is not equivalent to treating primal impression as an 
'overlap'; it doesn't deny that there is a primal impression; it doesn't 
conceive  of  primal  impression  as  simply  the  passive  product  of 
retention  and  protention;  but  it  does  conceive  of  retention  and 
protention as contributing to the constitution of primal impression (and 
vice versa) -- consistent with the idea of a self-constituting flow.  The 
unity of consciousness at this level is not a static unity, or an additive 
kind of unity, but an enactive unity.  There is no primal impression 
without retention and protention; there is no retention or protention 
without primal impression. 
What the primal impression is, then, and how it relates to 
retention and protention, are not independent from the intentional nature 
of consciousness, or from the specific content that we experience.  This 






considered as in-the-world, and in very pragmatic terms. We take this to 
be a positive way to account for the temporality of consciousness that 
lines up well with Husserl’s conception of embodied experience as an “I 
can.”   In contemporary terms, we can think of this as an enactive 
phenomenon.  My hearing of the melody, for example, is not a passive 
reception of  the  sound.    My  hearing of  any  one note is  a  hearing 
directed toward the next note – that is, I only hear one note as the 
anticipation of the next note, or the next bit of silence – as something 
that is leading somewhere – and I never hear it just on it’s own.  Again, 
as Husserl put it, “every living is living towards (Entgegenleben).” This 
anticipatory intentionality is not an apprehension of an absence 
(entgegenwärtigung), in the sense that it is directed toward the not yet; 
it is rather an apprehension of the possibilities or the affordances in the 
present, of what S can be for my experience, possibilities that will be 
fulfilled or not fulfilled as our enactive perception trails off in retention. 
The important question, in contrast to the inclinations of Derrida 
and Henry, is not whether any one element has priority.   Primal 
impression, retention, and protention are not elements that simply add 
themselves to each other. They are rather in a genetic relation; they 
have a self-constituting effect on each other. 
Moreover, they, together, constitute the possibility of an enactive 
engagement with the experienced world (the object, the melody, etc.). 
Just as I perceive the hammer as affording the possibility of grasping it, 
or in a different circumstance, as affording the possibility of propping 
open my window, I likewise perceive the melody as affording the 
possibility of dancing or sitting in peaceful enjoyment, etc. The point, 
however, is not about hammers versus melodies.   It’s about the 
temporality of affordances and enactive engagements. Nothing is an 
affordance  for  my  enactive  engagement  if  it  is  presented  to  me 
passively in a knife-edge present; that is, nothing would be afforded if 
there were only primal impressions, one after the other, without 
protentional anticipation, since  I  cannot enactively engage with  the 
world if the world is not experienced as a set of possibilities, which, by 
definition, involves the not-yet. And just as nothing would be possible if 
there were only primal impressions without a retentional-protentional 
structure, so too if there were no primal impression. If there were only 
retentions, everything I experience would already have just happened; 
we would be pure witnesses without the potential to engage. If there 
were only protentions, there would only be unfulfilled promises of 
engagement.   Meaning itself would dissipate under any of these 
conditions. 
Thus, the enactive character goes all the way down, into the very 
structure of time-consciousness, and one doesn’t get this enactive 
character without an integration of all three components. What we are 
suggesting here is that experience has an enactive character, not only on 
the act or action level, but in its most basic self-constituting, self- 
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